Torts -- Workmen\u27s Compensation -- Exclusive Remedy Doctrine by unknown
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 7 Number 1 Article 16 
12-1-1952 
Torts -- Workmen's Compensation -- Exclusive Remedy Doctrine 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Torts -- Workmen's Compensation -- Exclusive Remedy Doctrine, 7 U. Miami L. Rev. 126 (1952) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol7/iss1/16 
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
ordinary goods in that they are products of the intellect and both are matters
of public concern.' 2  Nevertheless, they follow the rules applicable to per-
sonal property.'
3
The only implied warranties in the sale of personal property, both
tangible and intangible are (1) that the seller has the power to sell, (2)
that the buyer has the right to enjoy quiet possession and (3) that the goods
are free at the time of sale from encumbrances in favor of a third person.
14
A purchaser of personal property must show a paramount contrary title from
which loss is certain to occnr. "  He cannot rescind for mere doubt of, or
cloud upon, the seller's title' or even upon discovering an outstanding claim
asserted by a third party.' 7  If he voluntarily yields to a third person, be
does so at his own peril.' 8
Neither in the sale of real property, nor in the sale of personal
property, is there any assurance that the buyer will be forever free from all
unjust or illegal interference.' The rights of the parties may differ, how-
ever, and the laws governing one may not be applicable to the other.2
Thus the court properly refused to extend the doctrine of implied warranty
of marketability of title to the sale of literary property.
TORTS-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY DOCTRINE
The plaintiff's wife, employed by the defendant, received an award
under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act.' The plaintiff, with-
out his wife's joinder, then sued the defendant for loss of consortium. Held,
affirming a summary judgment for the defendant, 2 the plaintiff's action was
barred by the compensation act." Danek v. Hommer, 9 N.J. 64, 87 A.2d 5
(1952).
3rd Cir. 1892); The Electron, 74 Fed. 689 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1896); Geist v. Stier, 134 Pa.
216, 19 Atl. 505 (1890).
12. lerzog v. Heyman, 151 N.Y. 587, 45 N.E. 1127 (1897).
13. Consumers' Gas Co. v. American Electric Construction Co., 50 Fed. 788 (C.C.A.
3rd Cir. 1892) (no defense if third party threatens suit); Herzog v. leyman, 151 N.Y.
587, 45 N.E. 1127 (1897) (can rescind only after reasonable defense).
14. CAL. Cry. CODE § 1733 (1949); UNIFORM SALES ACT § 13.
15. Barasch v. Kramer, 62 Misc. 475, 115 N.Y. Stipp. 176 (Sup Ct. 1909).
16. Hall v. Cocliranc, 24 Colo. App. 528, 135 Pac. 980 (1913); Duke v. California
Investment Co., 132 Wash. 32, 231 Pac. 20 (1924); Contra: Hollywood Plays Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 299 N.Y. 61, 85 N.E. 865 (1949).
17. Jones v. Hood, 46 S.W. 71 (Tex. 1898).
18. Courtney v. Gordon, 74 Mont. 408, 241 Pac. 233 (1925).
19. Wilson v. Calvert, 96 F. Stpp. 597 (D. Ariz. 1951) (vendor of realty can only
be expected to give good or marketable title); Rife v, Lybarger, 49 Ohio 422, 31 N.E.
7681(1892).. Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384 (US. 1850).
1. N.J. R.v. STAT. § 34:15-1 et seq. (1937).
2. Danek v. Hommer, 14 N.J. Super. 607, 82 A.2d 659 (County Ct. 1951).
3. "Such agreements shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to
amy other method, form or amnount of compensation or determination thereof .... and
CASES NOTED
If an employer's liability to an employee is limited to compensation, 4
the employer's liability to third parties damaged by the employee's injury,
illness, or death is also restricted to the benefits payable under the compen-
sation act.- This general rule has been applied in suits for wrongful death,6
for the pain and suffering of the deceased, 7 for loss of consortium,8 for loss
of services of a minor child,9 and for the expenses of caring for an injured
spouse or child. 10 However, some cases award a third-party tortfeasor forced
to respond in damages to an employee a right overagainst a negligent em-
ployer not limited by the compensation act." An infrequent but permissible
shall bind the employee himself and for compensation for his death and shall bind his
personal representatives, his widow and next of kin ...... N.J. REv. STAT. § 34:15-8
(1937).
4. "Compensation" as used throughout this discussion, whether as a noun or as an
adjective or as a part thereof, means "workmen's compensation."
5. Conversely, if the employee's recourse against the employer is not limited to
compensation, neither is a third party's recourse so limited. Statutory exceptions to the
applicability of the various acts are compiled in 2 LARSON, XVoEKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAw, App. A, tables 3-6, pp. 514-521. Among the typical exceptions are employer's
misconduct, illegal employment of minors and inapplicability to certain out-of-state injuries.
In a civil suit arising from an industrial mishap, the plaintiff must allege facts taking
the case out of the compensation field or his initial pleading is bad on demurrer, Ferguson
v. Pinson, 131 V.Va. 691, 50 S.E.2d 476 (1948), at least where it appears that normally
there would be coverage. Flint Electrical Membership Corp. v. Posey, 78 Ca. App. 597,
51 S.E.2d 869 (1949). However, a simple allegation that at the time of the accident the
defendant was not operating under the compensation act has been held sufficient. Cooke
v. Gillis, 218 N.C. 726, 12 S.E.2d 250 (1941). The employer's common law defenses
are usually abrogated but the plaintiff must show the employer's fault. Garcia v. De Leon,
59 A.2d 637 (D. C. Mon. App. 1948). Contra: Casey v. Hansen, 238 Iowa 62, 26
N.W.2d 50 (1947).
6. E.g., McDonald v. Miner, 218 Ind. 373, 32 N.E.2d 885 (1941); Hlas v. Quaker
Oats Co., 211 Iowa 348, 233 N.W. 514 (1930); Johnson v. Frankfort & C.R.R., 303 Ky.
256, 197 S.W.2d 432 (1946); Cozzo v. Atlantic Refining Co., 299 Mass. 260, 12 N.E.2d
744 (1938); Copozzoli v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 352 Pa. 183, 42 A.2d 524
(1945); Anthony v. National Fruit Canning Co., 185 Wash. 637, 56 P.2d 688 (1936)
(adm'r's action excluded although the wrongful death act was passed in Washington after
the compensation act). Contra: Weatherman v. Victor Gasoline Co., 191 Okla. 423,
130 P.2d 527 (1942) (before Oklahoma statute provided death benefits); Garfield Smelt-
ing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 53 Utah 133, 178 Pac. 57 (1918) (Utah Consti-
tution prohibited limiting right of action for wrongful death).
7. McDonnell v. Berkshire St. Ry., 243 Mass. 94, 137 N.E. 268 (1922); Landry v.
Acine Flour Mills Co., 202 Okla. 170, 211 P.2d 512 (1949).
8. Holder v. Elms Hotel Co., 338 Mo. 857, 92 S.W.2d 620 (1936); Swan v. Wool-
worth Co., 129 N.Y. Misc. 500, 222 N.Y. Supp. Ill (Sup. Ct. 1927); Bevis v. Armco
Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 295, 102 N.E.2d 444 (1951); Napier v. Martin, 250 S.W.2d
35 (Tenn. 1952); McVey v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 103 W.Va. 519, 138 S.E.
97 (1927). Contra: Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852 (1950).
9. Kimpel v. Garland Anthony Lumber Co., 216 Ark. 788, 227 S.W.2d 932 (1950);
Wall v. J. XV. Starr & Sons Lumber Co,, 68 Ga. App. 552, 23 S.E.2d 452 (1942);
Hilsinger v. Zimmerman Steel Co., 193 Iowa 708, 187 N.W. 493 (1922); Wall v. Stude-
baker Corp., 219 Mich. 434, 189 N.W. 58 (1922); Contra: Allen v. Trester, 112 Neb.
515, 199 N.W. 841 (1924) (issue of unconstitutionality; see note 17 infra); King v.
Viscoloid Co., 219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988 (1914).
10. Novack v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 158 Minn. 505, 198 N.W. 294 (1924);
Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Beasley, 49 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Deluhery v.
Sisters of St. Mary, 244 Wis. 254, 12 N.W.2d 49 (1943). Contra: King v. Viscoloid
Co., 219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988 (1914).
11. Permitting action for indemnity from the employer: Kittleson v. American Dist.
Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950); Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
non-compensation action is for direct infringement of a third party's right,
such as the right of the next of kin to have the dead body remain un-
mutilated.
12
There are exceptions to the majority, "exclusive remedy" theory even
among those situations where it generally applies. The oldest line of oppos-
ing cases is probably explained by statutory variation. 3 In those jurisdictions
holding the opposing view, only the employer and the employee seem to be
bound,'4 while in most jurisdictions the employer's liability is expressly ex-
clusive'5 or the statute enumerates the parties losing their non-compensation
rights, e.g., the employee, his or her personal or legal representative, depend-
ents, parents, spouse, next of kin, etc.' 6 One case found a provision of the
633 (1944) (bailor of car, liable under Motor Vehicle statutes, can recover indemnity
from bailee-employer who drove negligently and iniured employee); Westchester Lighting
Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
Permitting action for contribution from the employer: Portel v. United States, 85
F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Rederii v. Jarka Corporation, 82 F. Supp. 285 (D. Me.
1949). Contra: Coates v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779, 96 F. Supp. 1019
(D.C. 1951); Congressional Country Club, Inc. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 71 A.2d 696
(Md. 1950); Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Rukert Terminals
Corp., 193 Md. 20, 65 A.2d 304 (1949) (applying Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act); Brown v. Southern Ry., 202 N.C. 256, 162 S.E. 613 (1932); cf. Maio
v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940) (limiting contribution to liability under the
compensation act).
The Federal Second Circuit has dealt with the problem a number of times. See
Lo Blue v. United States, 188 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1951) and Second Circuit cases cited
therein.
12. Diebler v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 196 Misc. 618, 92
N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Patrick v. Employers Mit. Liability Ins. Co., 233 Mo.
App. 251, 118 S.W.2d 116 (1938) (Compensation insurer liable at law for unauthor-
ized autopsy).
See Price v. Yellow Pine Paper Mill Co., 240 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)
(wife shocked by blood); Shell Oil Co. v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County,
213 Cal. 596, 2 P.2d 801 (1931) (loss of support caused by drunkenness).
13. King v. Viscoloid Co., 219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988 (1914); Silurian Oil Co. v.
White, 252 S.W. 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); cf. Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Cope, 132
Okla. 152, 269 Pac. 1084 (1928) (exclusive remedy provision more comprehensive than
in Massachusetts and Texas acts). But cf., Courage v. Carleton, 96 N.H. 348, 77 A.2d
111 (1950); New Jersey cases cited in note 26 infra.
14. "An employee shall be held to have waived his right at common law . . . to
recover damages for personal injuries .... ." MAss. ANN. Lxws c. 152, § 24 (1950).
Similar provisions are in the statutes of Delaware, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas and Washington. Nebraska, New Jersey and Texas statutes
enumerate parties barred from death actions, and the Texas provision excludes actions by
minor employees' parents. The North Dakota and Washington statutes also abolish all
civil actions for covered injuries and deaths.
15. "Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such compen-
sation . . . is . . . the exclusive remedy against the employer for the injury or death."
CAL. LABOR CoDE § 3601 (1943). Similar provisions are in the statutes of Arizona,
Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The Wyoming statute also excludes actions by rep-
resentatives or by dependent family members.
16. "The liability of an employer . . . shall be exclusive and in place of any other
liability whatsoever, to such employee, his personal representative, husband, parents, de-
pendents or next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages, at common law or
otherwise on account of such injury or death...." N.Y. WORK. CoMs. L. § 11. Simi-
lar provisions are in the statutes of the states other than New York not mentioned in
notes 15 and 16 supra, Alaska, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii, The Federal
CASES NOTED
last type applying to parents unconstitutional on a comparatively technical
point.'7 Usually, even where the non-employee plaintiff is not eligible for
compensation benefits, the courts hold the exclusiveness of the remedy con-
stitutional'8 and do not hesitate to infer abrogation of all non-compensation
rights'-except in the jurisdictions where the less comprehensive provisions
apply.20  In Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,21 an unusual 22 and disturbing2 3 recent
decision, an action for loss of consortium was allowed despite strong exclu-
sive-remedy language. The opinion states that only derivative actions de-
pendent on the employee's rights are barred, not independent actions like
that for loss of consortium.
24
A relatively weak exclusive-remedy provision 25 was applicable in the
instant case, but the court understood the case law of the state26 to require
construing the compensation statute as a complete subsitute for all other
litigation arising out of a "covered" accident. It was feared that "To allow
a recovery per quod consortium amisit . . . would render the liability of the
employer most uncertain and indeterminate." 2  Vanderbilt, C.J., dissented
on the grounds that the provision is best construed as binding "the parties
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and the United States Em-
ployees' Compensation Act have similar provisions.
17. Allen v. Trester, 112 Neb. 515, 199 N.W. 841 (1924) (provision excluding par-
ents' actions held unconstitutional in that it was not germane to the remainder of the
section containing it).
18. Chapman v. Railway Fuel Co., 212 Ala. 106, 101 So. 879 (1924); Treat v.
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., 82 Cal. App. 610, 256 Pac. 447 (1927); Holder v.
Elms Hotel Co., 338 Mo. 857, 92 S.W.2d 620 (1936); Swan v. Woolworth Co., 129
N.Y. Misc. 500, 222 N.Y.Supp. Ill (Sup. Ct. 1927).
19. Chamberlain v. Florida Power Corp., 144 Fla. 719, 198 So. 486 (1940) (no de-
pendent survivors to receive compensation); Atchison v. May, 201 La. 1003, 10 So.2d 785
(1942) (no dependent survivors to receive compensation).
20. See note 13 supra.
21. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
22. The Hitaffer decision not only was was against the weight of authority from a
compensation viewpoint, but it was equally or more unusual in that it allowed a wife an
action for negligent destruction of consortium. Note, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 319 (1951).
23. Both the instant case and a similar recent Ohio case were probably inspired by
the Hitaffer decision. Danek v. Hommer, 14 N.J. Super. 607, 614-615, 82 A.2d 659,
662 (County Ct. 1951); Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 295, 299, 102 N.E.2d
444, 448 (1951).
24. The importance of the distinction between derivative and independent actions
seems doubtful. Actions for wrongful death are practically uniformly held to be excluded
by compensation acts. See note 6 supra. Yet wrongful death actions are independent,
not derivative. Blake v. Midland Ry., 21 L.J.Q.B. 233, 237 (1852) (of Lord Campbell's
Act: ". . . it will be evident that this act does not transfer this right of action to his
representative, but gives to his representative a totally new right of action on different
principles." Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 Ati. 549 (1930); see Michigan Cen-
tral R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68-70 (1913).
25. See note 3 suPra.
26. Hartman v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co., 93 N.J.L. 418, 108 Atl. 357 (Ct. Err. & App.
1919) (compensation act held to exclude minor's parent's action); Buonfiglio v. R. Neu-
mann & Co., 93 N.J.L. 174, 107 Atl. 285 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919) (compensation act
held to exclude minor's parent's action); Gregutis v. Waclark Wire Works, 86 N.I.L.
610, 92 AtI. 354 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914) (compensation act held to exclude wrongful
death action by aliens ineligible for compensation).
27. Danek v. Hommer, 9 N.J. 64, 68, 87 A.2d 5, 7 (1952).
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thereto" only and that the husband should not be deprived of a right
without compensation except by specific statutory wording.28
Workmen's compensation is primarily intended "to provide residents
... with a practical and expeditious remedy for their industrial accidents and
to place on . . . employers a limited and determinate liability."291 The
majority rule, followed in the instant case and in a recent Ohio case"0 also
inspired by the Hitaffer case, accomplishes the second end of compensation
but offers no solution to the problem of maintaining adequate relief to the
employee in the face of inflation." Admitting that the Hitaffer theory is a
haphazard and possibly unintended answer to the inflationary difficulties,
prompt legislative relief 32 still seems essential in order that judicial pity 3
may not be further tempted to warp the structure of workmen's compensa-
tion law.
34
TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE-BREACH OF
IMPLIED WARRANTY
Decedent purchased and used a branded salt substitute from the de-
fendant. In a suit by decedent's administratrix under the wrongful death
statute' for breach of implied warranty of fitness, held, the statute will be
28. Id. at 70, 87 A.2d at 8.
29. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947). See Bradford
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932).
30. Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 295, 102 N.E.2d 444 (1951) (action
for loss of consortium barred).
31. " . . . most legislatures have failed to keep such compensation acts abreast of the
times and rising cost of living ..... ".Horovitz, The Injured Worker's Plight, 2
N.A.C.C.A.L.J. 11, 16 (1948).
32. One legislative remedy is simply repeated adjustment of the compensation rates.
By the English statute, the employee retains his common law right of action but can-
not receive both damages and compensation. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, 15
& 16 CEO. 5, c. 84, § 29(1). Under a more recent British statute, the damages in a tort
action are reduced by one-half the probable compensation, if any. Law Reform. (Personal
Injuries) Act, 1948, 11 & 12 GEo. 6, c. 41, § 2. In the United States, compensation acts
benefit employers in that they provide for a limited and determinable liability. See note
29 supra. The English act seems to have a different approach. Russell-Jones, Workmen's
Compensation: Common Law Remedies and the Beveridge Report,7 MoDEFRN LAW RV,-
viEw 13, 23-25 (1944).
Legislation could provide for automatic cost-of-living adjustments of compensation
rates. Compensation principally replaces wages lost and more than 3,000,000 wage-earners
in the United States are covered by contracts with so-called "escalator clauses." N. Y.
Times, March 22, 1952, p. 1, col. 4.
33. There is good and frequent opportunity for judicial pity. There are 2,000,000
employees injured annually, 18,000 deaths annually, and over 100,000 permanently
maimed. Horovitz, The Injured Worker's Plight, 2 N.A.C.C.A.L.J. 11 (1948).
34. "1 should suppose that, like so many other questions, this was one of degree,
dependent as I have already suggested upon how far compensation, considering its cer-
tainty, could possibly be thought to be the equivalent of indemnity." See United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. R. It. Macy & Co., 156 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1946) (dissenting
opinion b y L. Hand, 1.) (employee limited to trivial compensation by majority holding).
i. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1951).
